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Abstract
A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have
opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs, or 118AB) market to
competition. We analyse the Spanish case, where both local and foreign
ﬁrms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. We argue that the in-
cumbent had the ability to abuse its dominant position, and that it was a
perfectly rational strategy. In short,the incumbent raised its rivals’ costs
directly by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input,
namely the incumbent’s subscribers’ database. We illustrate how it is pos-
sible to quantify the eﬀect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no
previous history in the market. To do this, we use the UK experience to
construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario.
After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we ﬁnd that
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1. Introduction
The European Union has initiated the liberalisation and opening up to competi-
tion of telecommunications through the adoption of a series of Directives which has
been shouldered by the publication of green papers and recommendations. Typ-
ically, this liberalisation process involves setting a deadline for complete market
opening, with an allowance being made for Member States being able to liberalise
ahead of the deadline. Liberalisation aﬀected distinct services at diﬀerent mo-
ments in time; for instance, data transmission and mobile telephony were opened
up to competition early on, while ﬁxed line voice telephony was liberalised later.
In practical terms, one of the last telecom services to be eﬀectively liberalised
are Directory Enquiries (DQs) over the telephone networks. The latter service
had traditionally been provided by the incumbent under a regulated monopoly
regime. Calls to a single universal number would give access to an operator that
would provide the phone number of a physical or legal subscriber. The same
kind of services was also available, at much higher prices, for international DQs.
That was made possible by a series of international agreements that involved set-
ting a single protocol for international DQs between members of the InternationalTelecommunications Union.
Two large markets, the UK and Spain, were eﬀectively opened to competition
in early 2003. The UK market was considered one of the most attractive, as the
total number of DQ calls was estimated to be about 600 million per year at the
time of liberalisation. Both UK and non-UK ﬁrms entered to challenge the incum-
bent, British Telecom (BT). In Spain, a similar entry pattern is observed, with
two non-Spanish ﬁrms (Telegate and Conduit) challenging the incumbent Tele-
fónica de España and its subsidiary, Telefónica Publicidad e Información (TPI) as
of April 2003. Further entry by local ﬁrms followed, while the Telefónica group
later launched an additional brand.
Conduit Ltd., one of the foreign entrants started legal proceedings against
Telefónica for abuse of dominance.1 While the latter concept has been under
discussion over the last few years, its application is straightforward in the case
analysed in this paper. There is no doubt that the incumbent enjoyed a domi-
nant position at the time when the market was eﬀectively opened to competition.
In addition, the conduct imputed to Telefónica does not fall into “grey area ac-
tions” that may be considered pro-competitive in a diﬀerent situation. Telefónica
raised its rivals costs and made entry more diﬃcult by deteriorating the quality
of an input that ought to have been made available for free, namely the data-
base containing information pertaining to ﬁxed line (PSTN) subscribers. As will
be described further on, Telefónica’s strategy was both implementable and proﬁt
maximising.
In November 2005, Madrid´s Fifth Commercial Court found Telefónica guilty
of abuse, and awarded a small amount of damages to Conduit. Part of the judge-
1Since September 2004, Spanish Commercial Courts have to apply Article 82 of the Treaty of
Rome which prohibits the abuse of dominance. This means that agents can now claim damages
for violations of Article 82.
2ment’s motivation relies on earlier ﬁndings of the industry regulator, the Comi-
sion del Mercado de Telecomunicaciones. Following this initial decision, both
Telefónica and Conduit appealed the verdict. In May 2006, the appeals court
(Audiencia Provincial de Madrid) upheld the initial ruling. As will be argued fur-
ther on, both decisions either reﬂect excessive caution or a lack of understanding
of the economics of the case, or a mix of the two.
The objective of the paper is to quantify the damages stemming from Tele-
fónica’s behaviour aimed at impeding the entry of new competitors. There exist
various methodologies to compute damages stemming from anti-competitive be-
haviour; Connor (2006) describes the various options that have been used (and
accepted) in US in competition law enforcement. In terms of his taxonomy, we
simultaneously apply a yardstick and econometric modelling approach. More pre-
cisely, we use Conduit’s experience on the UK market to econometrically estimate
its expected, abuse free, market share in Spain. In order to assess the validity
of our central results, we provide a series of robustness checks. As far as we un-
derstand, obtaining alternative estimates that yield consistent results is highly
valued by US anti-trust enforcers and forensic economists (Connor (2006), Fisher
(2006)).
In Europe, the use of rigorous forensic economic analysis in competition cases
is both new and rare (see Connor (2006)). To the best of our knowledge, only
the EU Commission and a few Member States (the UK among them) have ac-
cepted (or requested) econometric analyses in competition cases. In the case of
Spain, the practice has been almost inexistent, and whenever the parties have
spontaneously presented an econometrically based forensic analysis, Spanish en-
forcement authorities do not seem to have paid much attention. Last, the parties
involved usually prohibit the public diﬀusion of the results, even under strict con-
3ﬁdentiality conditions (the Volvo-Scania merger being an exception, see Ivaldi and
Verboven (2005)). In the case at hand, Conduit gave us permission, subject to
conﬁdentiality clauses, to write an academic paper. In that sense, this is a novelty
in the European context.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: section 2 brieﬂy describes
the technological characteristics of DQ services provision and drivers of demand.
Section 3 provides a conceptual rationalisation of the incumbent’s behaviour and
makes explicit predictions regarding the market share of entrants submitted to
aggressive behaviour by highlighting the importance of search costs. Section 4
quantiﬁes damages by using the UK experience to construct the “but for” scenario.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Supply and demand characteristics
The basic input required to provide DQ services is the database pertaining to
ﬁxed line subscribers. The latter are, principally, households, ﬁrms, and public
administrations. In the case of Spain, and in accordance with EU rules on cost
o r i e n t a t i o n ,t h ei n c u m b e n tw a ss u p p o s e dt op r o v i d et h i sd a t af o rf r e ei nar e a d y
to use standardised format to all entrants that met the relevant regulatory re-
quirements. In addition to the phone number(s), the database had to include
additional information such as postal address as well as fax number(s) whenever
applicable. From a commercial perspective, intelligent network numbers (90X or
80X) are particularly relevant, since they the fall into the category of “Frequently
Used Numbers” (FUNs), i.e. they represent a large proportion of DQ enquiries.
For an agent that does not own a network, the second necessary input is
access to the network so that enquiries to a given 118AB number end-up being
directed to the pertinent call center. Once routed to a centre, the call is put in a
4queue before being answered by an operator that uses a search engine to extract
the relevant information from a database. Once the enquiry is completed, the
operator may oﬀer “call termination”; the latter is an example of value added
service provided by DQ operators (others include SMS delivery of the number).
Once the basic operation has been set-up, a DQ service provider is not faced with
capacity constraints, save in the very short-run. It is indeed easy to attend a
growing number calls, either by hiring more operators or by subcontracting part
of the activity to a third party.
Prior to liberalisation, DQ services did not include value-added services and
were typically provided by the incumbent monopoly operator at a regulated price.
Basic DQ services may be considered as forming part of universal service oblig-
ations that have to be maintained by incumbent operators. As a consequence,
Spanish authorities decided to maintain a basic DQ service at a regulated price
to be provided by the incumbent, Telefónica. In principle, the market was opened
to entry for licensed operators in April 2002. For a period of one year, the old
regulated number (1003) was to coexist with commercial 118AB numbers. In
practice, the incumbent ensured that entry was impeded while 1003 still existed.
However, during this period, the Telefónica Group launched two numbers of its
own in February 2003. The ﬁrst (11888) was introduced by its fully controlled
subsidiary, TPI (Telefónica Publicidad e Información). The second (11818) was
launched by Telefónica as a direct substitute for 1003 as the new regulated service.
In the UK, a similar path was chosen: following liberalisation in December 2002,
the old regulated number provided by BT (192) was maintained until the end of
August 2003; thereafter both the old number and regulated services disappeared
altogether. The diﬀerence between Spain and the UK is that eﬀective entry was
possible for non-incumbent ﬁrms during the parallel running of the old number
5and the new commercial ones.
Under “normal” circumstances, the product oﬀered by 118AB providers is by
and large functionally homogeneous. In practice, service providers have horizon-
tally diﬀerentiated their products through advertising. In terms of quality, DQ
providers may diﬀer in terms of the accuracy of the information they provide (see
for instance, OFCOM 2003 & 2004). In addition, the speed at which an enquiry is
being dealt with may diﬀer across providers, for instance because of the time spent
queuing before being attended by an operator. In the industry’s jargon, “Service
Levels” refer to the time spent queuing while “Average Handling Time” (AHT)
is the average number of seconds that are eﬀectively charged on a call. Since the
price charged is usually formed by a two part tariﬀ (a ﬁxed fee for connection plus
a per second fee), quality adjusted prices may diﬀer across two operators that
oﬀer the service with the same tariﬀ structure (as AHTs may diﬀer). However,
the UK experience indicates that quality convergence among service providers (as
proxied by AHTs and Service Levels) is quick (OFCOM 2004). In other words,
quality diﬀerences are transitory.
Since the new DQ umbers were unknown to the public, the opening of the
market was accompanied by intensive advertising campaigns to promote brand
recognition. This dimension of horizontal diﬀerentiation is particularly marked in
this industry. Table 1 indicates that advertising intensity (measured as the ratio
of advertising eﬀort to the total number of calls) is very large.2
Insert Table 1 about here
This high advertising intensity reﬂects the fact that, in this industry, brand
recognition is the key to commercial success. Even after the initial launch pe-
2Given that the unit price is slightly below 1 €, these ratios are also an approximation of the
advertising to sales ratio.
6riod, advertising remains important to maintain number awareness (i.e., aimed at
ensuring that actual or potential customers remember the 118AB number being
advertised). In that respect, it is worth mentioning that in the UK, the adver-
tising campaign pursued by the one of the new entrants (The Number) acquired
something close to “cult status” and received various advertising awards.
The literature distinguishes between “persuasive” and “informative” adver-
tising. The former is aimed at altering consumer tastes and “creates spurious
diﬀerentiation and brand loyalty” (Bagwell, (2005), p.3) while the “informative”
kind performs the useful task of conveying product information to consumers.3
In practice, most markets are characterised by both types of advertising, and DQ
services are no exception. When the products were initially launched, advertis-
ing informed consumers of the 118AB alternatives. However, given the degree of
functional homogeneity of the products on oﬀer, advertising became of the “per-
suasive” type once consumers have been familiarised with 118AB numbers. In
such circumstances, “advertising can have important anti-competitive eﬀects, as
it has no “real” value to consumers, but rather induces artiﬁcial product diﬀer-
entiation and results in concentrated markets characterised by high prices and
proﬁts” (Bagwell (2005), p.3).
Despite the fact that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the technology
used in the UK and Spain, that entrants adopted similar strategies in each of these
markets, and that there is no a priori reason to believe that there exist marked
divergences in terms of consumer behaviour, the evolution of market structure has
been quite diﬀerent across the two countries. In the UK, although the number
of licensed operators is very large, the market quickly evolved into an oligopoly
3There is a third view on advertising, namely that it is a complement to the good being
purchased (e.g. the utility is derived from consuming a luxury good increases because it is
socially perceived as such because of advertising). This third category is not applicable to the
118AB market.
7dominated by The Number and BT. These two ﬁr m sa c c o u n tf o ra b o u t8 0 %o ft h e
market, while the remainder is shared among smaller operators. Among the fringe,
three operators nonetheless enjoy a signiﬁcant market share: Yell, Maureen, and
Conduit. The striking characteristic of the UK market is that the largest operator
is not the incumbent: BT’s market share is estimated at 35%, while The Number’s
stands at about 45%.4 Given Spain’s less extensive market, the number of active
operators with a signiﬁcant market share is smaller. The main diﬀerence with
the UK is reﬂected in the dominance still enjoyed by the Telefónica group. The
latter oﬀers three products: a regulated one (11818), and two commercial ones
(11822 and 11888). 11822 is provided by Telefónica de España, while 11888 is
marketed by its fully controlled subsidiary TPI. As can be seen from Table 2, the
data provided by the Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (CMT)
indicate these three brands accounted for more than 81% of the market at the end
of 2003.5 During 2004, that dominance was maintained, with the three Telefónica
brands still accounting for more than 79% of market revenue. Apart from a change
in the relative position of the smaller operators over the period, it is also worth
noting that while the overall market share of the Telefónica group has barely
changed, there has been a migration from the regulated number (11818) towards
the commercial ones (11888 and 18822). The rise of TPI’s number (a Telefónica
subsidiary) has been particularly spectacular: its share of market revenue jumped
from 29.5% to 49.1% in one year. It is worth pointing out that this number
(11888) is also the most expensive among the main commercial ones.
4Industry regulator OFCOM does not provide information on market shares. The UK ﬁg-
ures appearing in the text have been obtained from the press (BBC online) and specialised
information providers (e.g. 118tracker).
5This holds irrespective of whether market size is approximated by number of calls, total
minutes, revenue, or total number of enquiries (the latter may diﬀer from total calls as a single
call may result in two or more enquiries).
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3. Rationality of the alleged abuse
Conduit asked us to quantify the possible damages resulting from the incumbent’s
actions. In what follows (and in line with Spanish legal practice), we will refer
to the direct costs as the ones that can be quantiﬁed on the basis of direct and
“hard” evidence such as invoices. The indirect damages stem from the quantiﬁable
additional loss of proﬁts stemming from the abuse.
3.1. “Direct” costs
The central claim is that Telefónica impeded the entry of new competitors through
a combination of actions. First, it erected a series of obstacles to new entrants
prior to the eﬀe c t i v eo p e n i n go ft h em a r k e to nA p r i l52 0 0 3( t h e“ l a u n c hd a t e ” ) .
For instance, prior to launch, it dragged its feet to provide terms and conditions
for network access; when it did the price turned out to be such that downstream
activity would have been loss making under any reasonable parameter constella-
tion (a clear attempt of price-squeeze leading to foreclosure). On that particular
issue, the industry regulator had to intervene in order to force Telefónica to make
a reasonable non-discriminatory and cost-oriented oﬀer. Second, Telefónica failed
to provide the database in timely manner and in the format stipulated by the
CMT. When it did provide the data, it proved to be defective in a number of
respects. Many compulsory ﬁelds were left empty or were inaccurate (e.g. a fax
instead of a phone number would appear in the extraction process, or when more
than one number was associated with a commercial or administrative entity, it
did not stipulate which was the main one). In addition, intelligent network entries
(which represent the a large part of FUNs numbers) were simply missing. These
9claims were upheld by the Courts.6
For a new entrant, this generated additional costs that would not have oth-
erwise been incurred. Since the data was faulty, the entrant hired personnel to
“ﬁxi t ” . T h i st a s ki n v o l v e do b t a i n i n gi n formation from printed version of the
telephone directory (white and yellow pages) and/or surﬁng the web. In addition,
operators were, all else equal, slower since the extractions would sometimes return
blank ﬁelds, leading to an increase in AHTs. In addition, the new entrant was
faced with a very real short term problem, namely to provide information once
the operation had gone live. Since the data was of such poor quality, the ﬁrm
had to turn to the E.115 service, a costlier alternative which was meant to be
used for international enquiries only. E.115 is a protocol developed by members
of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in order to provide foreign
phone numbers in a standardised format. That service is oﬀered by existing tele-
com operators on the basis of per consultation fee; it is not possible to download
the E.115 database. In addition, E.115 consultations are slower, thus leading to
increased AHTs. Given that each E.115 consultation eﬀectively cost about 0.40
€, and that the entrant’s prices stood at approximately 0.30€ per enquiry, it
meant that the margin was negative, even before advertising, wages, overheads,
and other expenses were taken into account. Apart from generating pecuniary
costs, the faulty database led to a deterioration in service quality. During the
early stages, the entrant’s AHTs were well above international standards, and
above its performance in the UK market. Moreover, the accuracy of the informa-
tion suﬀered substantially. In short, this new operator was oﬀering lower quality
at a price above the one it would have charged had AHTs been shorter.
Raising a rival’s direct costs (RRDC) and forcing quality deterioration (QD)
6Decisions by Madrid´s Fifth Commercial Court (November 2005) and by the Audiencia
Provincial de Madrid (May 2006).
10form part of a single abusive strategy; stricto sensu, forcing QD increases a rival’s
costs. However, distinguishing between increases in direct costs and QD is useful
in the context of the empirical exercise. We will refer to RRDC as the eﬀect
of Telefónica’s actions on the entrant’s costs, while forced QD represents abuse
induced changes in the residual demand faced by that ﬁrm.
A combination of RRDC and forced QD is a very attractive strategy for an
incumbent bent on impeding entry into a lucrative market.7 C o m p a r e dt oam o r e
“traditional” case of predatory pricing, a combination of RRDC and QD provides
immediate beneﬁts, as opposed to sacriﬁcing short term proﬁts for future, possibly
elusive, proﬁts once exit takes place. In addition, it does not require exit: it is
suﬃcient to weaken the entrant in order to achieve additional proﬁts above those
that would obtain in an abuse-free situation. Nor is it necessary to have access to
a “deep pocket”.8 As will be argued below, the existence of search costs in this
market renders this strategy all the more attractive, since it can have permanent
eﬀects beyond the time period during which the abuse is taking place stricto
sensu. For all of the above, such a strategy (involving both RRDC and QD)
is more credible. To sum-up, within the menu of aggressive postures, RRDC
combined with QD is highly attractive for the incumbent.
3.2. Static eﬀects
Economides (1998) presents a model that neatly ﬁts this situation. In his paper,
there is a vertically integrated ﬁrm that enjoys a position of upstream monopoly
for the provision of an essential input for downstream production. In the latter,
the monopolist control a subsidiary that competes à la Cournot with other ﬁrms.
He shows that, under very general conditions, the vertically integrated monopolist
7See the classic contributions of Salop and Scheﬀman, (1983, 1987).
8It should be noted that the Telefónica Group is highly unlikely to face such a constraint in
any case.
11has an incentive to raise its downstream rivals’ costs. In his own words (p. 278):
“Therefore any increase of rivals’ costs above zero results in increased proﬁts for
the integrated monopolist and subsidiary”. In addition: “Raising rivals’ costs
allows the monopolist to “manage” the downstream market and force indepen-
dents to exit. Thus, in the medium and long run, the consequences of non-price
discrimination can be much more adverse to social welfare than the short run
consequences that I have described” (p. 278). Last, Economides (1998) shows
that his results also applies when cost raising strategies are substituted by forc-
ing quality downgrading: “inspection of the proﬁt maximization conditions (..)
shows that the results of this paper also hold for a discriminatory degradation of
the quality of the input oﬀered to rivals which decreases the willingness to pay
for the rivals’ downstream output but leaves costs unaﬀected. In such a setup,
independent downstream ﬁrms have marginal cost w + s, but, since they have a
lower quality product, consumers are willing to pay only p − r for their product
(while consumers pay p for the subsidiary’s output). That is, the independents
face a demand curve that is a parallel downward shift by r of the demand faced
by the subsidiary (pp. 278-279)”. It is worth noting that similar results would
obtain if the downstream industry were to de modelled as a horizontally diﬀer-
entiated market in the line of Salop (1979). Our claim is that the Telefónica’s
strategy resulted in both directly increasing costs and downgrading quality, with
each eﬀect reinforcing one another.9
Objections were raised to Economides’ (1998) paper; in particular, the gen-
erality of his ﬁndings were questioned. In a series of contributions (Sibley and
Weisman, (1998a, b)), models were presented in which a vertically integrated mo-
9Conceptually, RRDC and QD may be considered as indistinguishable, as a single action
produces one outcome. In practical terms, the distinction between RRC and QD is useful, as
we have directly observed some of the direct costs associated with Telefónica’s actions aimed at
RRDC, while the “indirect eﬀect” (QD) is econometrically estimated.
12nopolist facing competition in the downstream market would not have incentives
to RRDC. The intuition is the following: if the monopolist enjoys positive margins
in the upstream market and its downstream market share is very small, a coun-
tervailing eﬀect to the incentive to RRDC emerges. Since the monopolist derives
proﬁts from selling the essential input, it beneﬁts from larger sales to downstream
ﬁrms as long as its subsidiary commands a negligible market share. Mandy (2000)
provides a general overview of models were this second eﬀect may dominate the
cost raising incentive. Mandy (2000) also identiﬁes the real world conditions re-
quired for the cost raising incentive to disappear. None of these conditions are
present in the case at hand, that is Telefónica clearly has incentives to RRDC and
to force QD. First, upstream margins are zero, or close to zero: the database had
to be provided for free, and interconnection charges are cost-oriented. In both
cases, this results from a regulatory decision. By contrast, downstream price-
cost margins are very high (50% or more). Last, Sibley and Wiesman (1998a)
simulated their model using reasonable parameter values. They show that if the
downstream subsidiary enjoys a market share greater than 26%, the cost-raising
incentive dominates, even under the most “adverse” conditions for this eﬀect to be
present. Given that Telefónica’s market share is way above this threshold, RRDC
is optimal.10
3.3. Dynamic eﬀe c t si nt h ep r e s e n c eo fs e a r c hc o s t s
In view of the speciﬁcs of this market, Telefónica’s actions had an eﬀect beyond
the time period during which the entrant had to operate with a defective database.
The existence of search costs combined with the fact that this market was opened
to eﬀective competition for the ﬁrst time in April 2003 means that developments
10This statement holds true irrespective of how market share is computed on the basis of
number of calls, minutes, or revenue.
13during the launch period (the ﬁrst 4 to 6 months) persisted over time. Liberalised
DQ services were new to Spanish consumers: a single regulated number (1003)
was replaced by various 118AB numbers; the latter (save for the regulated one)
were allowed to provide value-added services; quality levels were unknown; and
ﬁnally, prices levels (and diﬀerences thereof) were also new. In short, consumers
had to incur search costs in order to obtain information regarding these new oﬀers.
For an average consumer, these search costs are low in absolute value, but very
large compared to the potential savings to be achieved by incurring them. As is
well known, this is the trade-oﬀ facing consumers: it is not the absolute value of
search costs that matters, but whether it is worth incurring them. As pointed-out
by the British National Audit Oﬃce (2005), expenditure on DQ services is a very
low proportion of income; as a consequence, the savings to be achieved by looking
for the best oﬀer are minute when compared to total income.
The importance of adopting a dynamic approach when search costs are present
is stressed by NERA’s (2003) report to the UK’s Oﬃce of Fair Trading (OFT)
and Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). In their words: “When assessing an
abuse of dominance investigation with switching costs, the importance of taking
a dynamic approach cannot be overstated. (...) Competition in markets with
switching costs can often be divided into a ‘phase 1’ and a ‘phase 2’. In phase
1 ﬁrms price low to build a customer bases, whilst in phase 2, they concentrate
on ‘milking’ their installed customer base and price high”.11 Further, the report
notes that the ability of ﬁrms to extract rents is inversely proportional to the
competitiveness of the market during ‘phase 1’.
The evolution of the DQ market neatly ﬁts this two-phases description: the
initial launch (during which ﬁrms’ “plough”, or “invest in”, the market) followed
11The discussion is framed in terms of switching costs; the same conclusions hold in the
presence of search costs.
14by a stabilisation period (during which ﬁrms “harvest” or “milk” the market).
During the launch phase, providers build a customer base through intensive ad-
vertising, while consumers experiment the products on oﬀer. It is plausible to
think that the bulk consumers that have a satisfactory experience with a partic-
ular 118AB number will stick to it. By contrast, a bad experience during this
experimentation phase is likely to induce the consumer to switch, or stop consum-
ing the good. In addition, a negative experience during that initial phase may
induce more consumers to switch (or choose another brand for the ﬁrst purchase)
because of hearsay. During the second phase, proﬁt maximising ﬁrms set prices
given the market share that they have achieved during the launch period. As a
consequence, market shares and prices stabilise, while advertising becomes more
sporadic and aimed at maintaining awareness of a particular 118AB number. In
a market with these characteristics, second period market shares are a function of
ﬁrst period ones.12 This correspondence is strongest when agents share the same
technology, i.e. face similar costs. Last, the existence of search costs also ensures
that second period equilibrium prices will be set above marginal cost.
In short, the time to proﬁtably build a market share is during the launch phase,
when customer’s have not yet chosen a brand to patronise. Building a customer
base at a later stage is unlikely to be proﬁtable, since it is much more costly to
induce customers to switch to a new brand as opposed to simply maintaining
them.13
12See, for instance, the classical contributions of Klemperer (1987, 1992) or the extensive
analysis carried for the OFT and the DTI by NERA (2003).
13In general terms, the marketing literature (see, for instance, Kotler (1997)) indicates that
in order to attract a new customer, it is necessary to spend ﬁve times more on advertising
as compared to maintaing a client that already buys the product. This order of magnitude is
consistent with the experience of MGA, a late entrant on the Spanish DQ market (that launched
in June 2003). Despite heavy advertising in 2003-2004 (26.6% of total spend in 2004) and about
average prices, its market share stood at 4.8% at the end of 2004 (cf. Table 4).
154. Identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of the abuse
For practical purposes, we have decomposed possible abuse related losses into
direct costs and the additional loss of proﬁts once the direct costs have been netted
out. It is straightforward to show that the lost proﬁts resulting from the abuse are
always larger than the direct costs that can be imputed to the incumbent’s actions.
Save for the polar cases of Bertrand competition with no capacity constraints
or perfect competition, ﬁrms face a downward slopping residual demand curve.
Suppose constant marginal costs MC,a n dt h a taﬁrm faces the residual demand
depicted in Figure 1. In the absence of abuse, the ﬁr mw o u l de a r ng r o s sp r o ﬁts
equal to BCDE. If its costs are increased to MC0, and proﬁts dwindle to AB.
The “direct damage” is equal to the quantity produced under abuse times the
increase in costs, that is D.E v e ni ft h eﬁrm manages to recover D through the
courts, it still suﬀers a net loss, as A<C E .14
Insert Figure 1 about here
While useful to show that total damages are greater than direct costs, Figure
1 does not depict the eﬀect of forced QD. In addition, it ignores the importance
of search costs and the fact that the abuseo c c u r r e db e f o r ea n dd u r i n gt h el a u n c h
phase. In this paper, we almost completely ignore abuse related costs prior to
A p r i l2 0 0 3b e c a u s eo fl a c ko fq u a n t i ﬁable data; it should however be borne in
mind that their consequence was that Conduit was not as ready as it would have
l i k e do nl a u n c hd a y .
New entrants in these markets build a market share with intense advertising.
The latter increases demand for the ﬁr m ’ sp r o d u c ti ne a c hp e r i o da n dc a nb ec o u -
14This always holds, since proﬁt maximization in the absence of abuse implies that
BCDE>ABD.
16pled with low, cost oriented prices during launch. Once a suﬃciently large market
share is built, prices are raised in order to recoup advertising outlays and generate
proﬁts. The combination of low initial prices and heavy advertising results in a
steady increase in market share, followed by a drop once prices are raised (which
would correspond to the beginning of the stabilisation period). Figure 2 depicts
the expected evolution of the market share of a ﬁr m( F i r m1 )t h a tf o l l o w st h i s
course of action. In this example, the price charged during two initial periods
equals (or is close to) marginal cost; as of period 3, prices are raised thus resulting
in a drop in market share. As of period 4, which corresponds to the ﬁrst phase of
the stabilisation period, market share ﬂuctuates around a level.
In both Spain and the UK, Conduit has adopted advertising cum low initial
prices to build its customer base, and raised its prices later. In Graph 1, we
represent the evolution of that ﬁrm’s market share in these two markets; the scale
on the vertical axis has been transformed for reasons of conﬁdentiality.15
Insert Figure 2 about here
Insert Graph 1 about here
It is simple to represent the evolution of a ﬁrm that adopts a penetration
strategy based on low prices and advertising and that is subjected to an abuse
which results in inﬂated costs and forced QD. Ceteris paribus, higher costs mean
that fewer resources are available for advertising. More importantly, forced QD
means that advertising is less eﬀective at increasing demand during each period
of the launch phase. Once the “stabilisation period” begins, the market share
ﬂuctuates around a level which is lower than that which corresponds to an abuse-
15The construction of these market shares is described in section 6.
17free situation. This evolution is depicted by the line labelled Firm 1’ in Figure 2.
Note that the gap between curves Firm1 and Firm 1’ only reﬂects the forced QD
suﬀered by the entrant; direct costs have to be added to the proﬁtl o s ss t e m m i n g
from this lower market share.
This statement is illustrated in Figure 3a.16 In order to simplify exposition,
assume that this corresponds to the ﬁrst period of the stabilisation phase. In line
with Economides (1998), it is assumed that forced QD results in the leftward shift
of the residual demand curve faced by the ﬁrm from d(p) to d0(p). In addition, the
incumbent’s RRDC strategy raises constant marginal costs upwards from MC to
MC0. Assume that the ﬁrm chooses prices and quantities which correspond to
the intersection between marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC). In the
absence of any kind of abuse, the ﬁrm would face d(p) and MC,s e tp r i c ea tp1,
sell q1, and obtain gross proﬁts equal to Π =( p1 − MC)q1. As a consequence of
the abuse, the ﬁrm faces MC0 and d0(p), sets price at p∗ and sells q∗, obtaining
(p∗ −MC0)q∗ gross proﬁts. In this example, the “direct costs” as we have deﬁned
them are equal to (MC0 −MC)q∗ = X. Full compensation for lost proﬁti se q u a l
to (p1 − MC)q1 −(p∗ −MC0)q∗. As will be explained below, we cannot estimate
this amount. However, what we can estimate is the market share that the entrant
ought to have obtained in the absence of QD, given the price it actually set (p∗
in this example). Concretely, we are able to estimate the magnitude of Π1 =
(p∗ − MC)(q2 − q∗). Thus, the damages that were able to quantify are the sum
of X (direct costs) and Π1 (the latter due to QD). Note that the amount that
we identiﬁed is smaller than the one that corresponds to full compensation.17
Figure 3a also permits to depict the damages suﬀered by the entrant’s during
16The discussion is framed in terms of pricing (and not pricing and advertising) behaviour for
ease of exposition.
17Again, this obtains immediately: in the absence of abuse, p1 and q1 maximise proﬁts;
therefore p∗ and q2 yield lower gains.
18later periods when data problems were supposedly solved. In the initial stages,
the entrant faces MC0, and damages we compute amount to X + Π1.A tal a t e r
stage, marginal costs fall back to MC, and our approach proxies Π1∗,d e ﬁned as
Π1∗ =( p3 − MC)(q4 − q3).
Insert Figure 3a about here
The argument developed above holds if the only eﬀect of forced QD is to
lower the quality oﬀered by the entrant, as reﬂected by the inward shift of the
residual demand it faces. It could however be the case that the abuse also reduces
the intensity of competition. In that case, all ﬁrms would price less aggressively
as a consequence of forced QD. The converse is that, in the absence of abuse,
ﬁrms’ residual demand would be more elastic, reﬂecting the higher intensity of
competition. In other words, the abuse free residual demand that the entrant
would have faced is not d(p) (cf. Figure 3a), but f(p) depicted in Figure 3b. If
this is the case, the amount damages (above direct costs) remain positive, but
are lower. To illustrate this point, imagine that RRDC is absent, and that the
abuse only consists of forced QD. In the abuse free benchmark characterised by
a higher intensity of competition, the entrant would have earned proﬁts equal to
(p5−MC)q5. As before, forced QD results in the ﬁrm facing d(p)0 instead of f(p),
earning gross proﬁts equal (p3−MC)q3. In these circumstances, full compensation
would amount to (p5 − MC)q5 − (p3 − MC)q3. Again, we cannot compute this
magnitude, but we can estimate the loss of proﬁts given the ﬁrm’s observed pricing
behaviour. In this second example, this amounts to Π2 =( p3 − p5)(q6 − q3)
Insert Figure 3b about here
In each of these two cases, the total of damages is higher than what we are
19to quantify econometrically. The diﬀerence between the two scenarios is that in
t h es e c o n d ,w ep o s i tt h a tc o m p e t i t i o nw o u l dh a v eb e e nt o u g h e ri nt h ea b s e n c eo f
abuse.
5. Construction of the “but for” scenario
In order to compute damages, it is necessary to construct a counterfactual, the
“but for the abuse” scenario. The latter exercise can not make use of the data
pertaining to the market and time period during which the abuse took place
as the data is distorted (Hall (1994), Ashurst (2004)). Since the entrant never
experienced an abuse-free situation in Spain, this precludes the use of Spanish
data to build the “but for” scenario. We have therefore used the UK market to
construct a competitive reference point. We chose econometric estimation over
possible alternatives, such as calibrating a theoretical model. The fundamental
reason is that we need to capture the idiosyncrasies of a market characterised by
ﬁrst time entry and a launch period dedicated to building a customer base in the
case of a new entrant. Calibrating a model a carrying out comparative statics
exercises would not permit a proper treatment of this crucial initial phase.
Using the UK experience to construct the but for scenario is motivated by the
following reasons. First and foremost, we observe the same ﬁrm on both markets;
this allows us to directly estimate the ﬁrm level ﬁxed eﬀect. In addition, the entry
strategy adopted is the same in both countries: cost oriented prices shouldered by
heavy advertising, followed by a posterior increase in prices. Graph 2 provides the
re-scaled evolution of Conduit’s prices in the UK and Spain; combining it with
Graph 1 visually illustrates the entrant’s strategy.18 Second, the opening up of
the market coincides almost perfectly in the two countries (December 2002 for the
18At the beginning of the period, the high eﬀective prices charged by Conduit on the Spanish
market are due to inﬂated AHTs derived from the abuse.
20UK, April 2003 for Spain). Conduit’s actual launch dates is April 2003 on both
markets. Third, the UK market has not been distorted by any abuse.19 Fourth,
the initial market structure is identical across the two markets: an incumbent
facing the entry of new competitors. Fifth, per capita incomes are no too far
apart. Sixth, during the launch period, advertising intensity measured as total
expenditure over potential market size was very similar across the two countries
(cf. Table 1).20 Last, the technology used in both markets is essentially the
same.21
Insert Graph 2 about here
Apart from the abuse, there are some additional diﬀerences across the two
markets. In Spain, the old regulated number (1003) was abolished as of April
2003. In addition, the regulator imposed a so-called “carrousel”. During the
period April-July 2003, calls to 1003 were answered by a recorded message that
quoted the numbers of the active entrants.22 S i n c et h en u m b e r sw e r eq u o t e d
on a rotating basis, a large number of calls were directed to the new entrants.23
19There has been a complaint against BT ﬁled by the new entrants. The core of the case
was whether BT had abused its dominant position by advertising its new number in the paper
edition of the phonebook. A detailed enquiry, which included the use of econometric techniques,
was carried out. The case was closed without penalties, as it was established that BT’s conduct
had no material eﬀect on competition (Decision of the Director General of Telecommunications,
case CW/604/03/03).
20The experience of other countries that have liberalised their DQ services indicate that there
is clearly room for more than one large operator in Spain. In Norway (a much smaller market,
with less than 60 million calls in 2002), two ﬁrms have successfully challenged the incumbent
(see Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority, (2003), “Competition in the Norwegian
market for directory enquiries - an analysis and evaluation”).
21Conduit’s experience in markets other than the UK (e.g. Switzerland or Austria) presents
some serious drawbacks to be used to construct the “but for” scenario. Apart from the fact
that the time periods do not coincide, the main limitations is that in these other countries,
liberalisation has been incomplete. However, it is important to note that the entrant already
had extensive experience in terms of entering foreign markets in which it had to operate in a
diﬀerent language than that of its country of origin.
22In April, 4 new numbers were active; in July 2003, 6 numbers were quoted.
23The imposition of a carrousel by the CMT was motivated by the desire to facilitate entry
21By contrast, in the UK, the old regulated number was maintained until the end
of August 2003, and no “carrousel” was put in place after the disappearance
of the 192 number. In addition, the number of active entrants has been larger
in the UK, even if allowance is made of the diﬀerent country sizes (60 versus
40 million inhabitants). Last, the UK has pioneered telecom liberalisation in
Europe, possibly suggesting that both consumers and ﬁrms are well accustomed
to a ﬁercely competitive environment, and therefore act accordingly (e.g. being
more price sensitive). All these characteristics suggest that, in the absence of
abuse, entry in the UK would have been more diﬃcult than in Spain. In the
econometric exercise, we are only able to control for the maintenance of the 192
number by including a time dummy; it is not however possible to control for the
other characteristics that make the UK market more competitive.
6. Econometric speciﬁcation and variable deﬁnition
We estimate a market share equation for the entrant in the UK market; we then
use these UK results to predict the evolution of that operator’s market share in
Spain. There are two basic approaches to estimate market share equations. The
ﬁrst approach, commonly used in the marketing literature, consists of the estima-
tion of market response models that predict the inﬂuence of marketing variables
on market share (see Kumar and Heath, (1990), or Kumar et al, (2002), among
others). These models can be used to infer the cross-eﬀects between a set of mar-
keting variables (prices, advertising, discounts,...), but one can also learn about
the eﬀects of own eﬀorts while conditioning on competitive reactions. Usually,
these models are proposed in a linear, multiplicative, or in the so-called attraction
in view of the impediments that new operators had faced as a consequence of the incumbent’s
behaviour prior to the launch date.
22form.24 Among these speciﬁcations, the attraction from is the most adequate, as
it simultaneously estimates the behaviour of all participants’ market shares and
it embodies a series of restrictions (e.g. market shares are between zero and one
and sum to 1). The second approach, more common in the economics literature,
is the estimation of logit demand models that are based on a model of individual
brand choice (see Nevo (2000) for a survey of logit demand models). In these
models, consumers observe prices and product characteristics for J diﬀerentiated
products and choose the product that maximizes their utility. The speciﬁcation
of a demand system is completed with the introduction of an outside good, since
individuals may decide not to purchase any of the brands. These models have
been successfully estimated both with household level and aggregate data (see
Allenby and Rossi (1991)). Although logit demand models are utility based, their
speciﬁcation coincides with an attraction model that embodies restrictions on the
competitive process (the attraction of brand j only depends on own explanatory
variables), and where attraction depends on the exponential of the marketing
variables.
Our choice of model speciﬁcation is driven by data availability. As we describe
in next section, we do not have information regarding competitors’ market shares.
This precludes the estimation of a fully ﬂedged attraction model. Therefore, we
estimate an additive and multiplicative form of the market share response models,
but for Conduit only. In addition, we estimate a logit demand model for that ﬁrm.
The marketing mix variables relevant in the DQ market are prices and adver-
tising. The three speciﬁcations that we estimate are deﬁned as follows:
24In attraction models, the market share of a brand is determined by its attraction, Ajt,w i t h




. T h ea t t r a c t i o no fab r a n dd e p e n d so nt h e
mix of its own and competitors’ marketing variables.
231. Additive speciﬁcation. This speciﬁc a t i o ni m p l i e st h a tw ea s s u m et h a tt h e
market share for each brand is a linear function of the marketing mix vari-
ables. Thus, the equation to estimate is:
MSit = βi0 + βi1relPit + βi2relAit + Q
0
tβi3 + εit (1)














price relative to that of its competitors, with J equal to the number of active




is the ﬁrm’s advertising eﬀort relative to total. Q0
t
is a set of time dummies to control for possible changes in market shares due to
holidays and diﬀerent days of the week. It also includes a dummy taking value 1
for the period April-August 2003 (and zero thereafter) to control for the continued
existence of the old regulated number (192).
2. Multiplicative speciﬁcation. This speciﬁcation assumes that market shares
are a multiplicative function of the marketing mix variables:





where the deﬁnition of the variables is as above. Therefore the equation to estimate
is given by:
ln(MSit)=βi0 + βi1 ln(relPit)+βi2 ln(relAit)+Q
0
tβi3 + εit (2)
243. Logit demand. Logit demand models are derived from individual discrete
choice models. In the simplest version, heterogeneity among consumers is
introduced in the model via the inclusion of a separable additive random
shock, εit. If we assume that this shock is identically and independently
distributed among individuals according to a Type I extreme value distrib-
ution, the market share of a brand i coincides with the probability that an




exp(αi + δ1Pit + δ2Ait + εit)
1+
P
exp(αj + δ1Pjt + δ2Ajt + εjt)
where Pit and Ait stand for the price and advertising eﬀort of ﬁrm i at time t,
and j denotes active ﬁrms (including ﬁrm i). There also exists the possibility of
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0t + αi + δ1Pit + δ2Ait + Q
0
tβi3 + εit (3)
Note that the market share in equation (3) is diﬀerent than the ones that
appear in equations (1) and (2), since we also include consumers that do not
purchase any brand. In other words, ﬁrm i’s market share is deﬁned over the
potential market (the latter also encompasses consumers that do not make any
purchase).25
25Apart from speciﬁcations (1)-(3), we estimated our market share equations with an alter-
native set of regressors (e.g., by using a time trend and its square instead of a yearly dummy,
or with alternative values for potential market size in the logit speciﬁcation). This additional
set of results yielded very similar estimates.
25Four comments are in order regarding the identiﬁcation of equations (1), (2),
and (3). First, these equations form a system of J equations, one for each market
participant. As mentioned above, Conduit is the only ﬁrm for which we have a
suﬃcient number of observations on market shares. Consequently, we estimate (1),
(2), and (3) for that ﬁrm only. The parameters are then identiﬁed by the (daily)
time series variation of the explanatory variables. Provided there is suﬃcient
time variation, the parameter estimates are consistent, although not necessarily
eﬃcient. Second, the three speciﬁcations include a constant that picks-up any time
invariant ﬁrm speciﬁce ﬀect. This constant can be consistently estimated given
the long time series that we use (more than 500 daily observations). Therefore,
we control for any unobserved time invariant ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect. Third,
there may be a source of simultaneity in the explanatory variables if there exist
daily shocks that aﬀect both daily prices and/or advertising as well as the error
term. Therefore, we estimate the three equations by applying the Generalised
Method of Moment (GMM), thus allowing for the endogeneity of both variables.
Last, the use of daily data suggest that the errors are probably autocorrelated.
As we will see below, given the type of instruments that we use, the presence of
autocorrelated errors does not aﬀect the consistency of the coeﬃcient estimates
but it aﬀects the consistency of the standard errors estimates. Therefore, we
compute standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.26
With respect to the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables the sit-
uation is diﬀerent for advertising and prices. In our context, it is reasonable to
think that these variables are predetermined. The reason why we believe that the
regressors may be predetermined is that advertising is booked months ahead of
actual spend, and the entrant’s pricing strategy is “mechanical” and established
26The robust standard errors use a kernel (Newey-West) based heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent (HAC) estimation procedure.
26prior to actual launch (cf. Graph 2). However, as we describe in next section, we
construct the daily observations pertaining to advertising on the basis of their the
monthly counterparts. More precisely, At (daily advertising) being predetermined
m e a n st h a ti ti su n c o r r e l a t e dw i t hεt in equations (1), (2) and (3). But this does
not preclude that future realisations of A being correlated with the error in pe-
riod t. In the regressions, we use At =
At−15+...+At+...+At+15
31 instead of At.T h u s ,
E(εt | At) is diﬀerent from zero, even if At is predetermined. Therefore, we as-
sume in all empirical speciﬁcations that the advertising variables are endogenous.
For prices the situation is diﬀerent since we have access to daily observations and
therefore we do not introduce any additional correlation between this regressor and
the errors. Actually, Conduit sets prices equal, or close to, marginal cost during
the launch phase (approximately 6 months) and then raises its prices (typically by
doubling them), but remains among the cheapest commercial alternatives. This
is the pattern observed on both the UK and Spanish markets (cf. Graph 2). Still,
we did not impose that this variable is predetermined and we test its endogeneity
in the context of GMM.
Last, our speciﬁcation of the logit demand equation does not allow for het-
erogeneity among consumers. This is equivalent to imposing a particular form of
cross-price elasticities among ﬁrms, namely that the degree of substitution among
brands is the same. This is a problematic assumption for some markets (e.g. the
automobile industry as in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, (1995), that consider all
vehicle classes, or the ready-to-eat cereal market analysed in Nevo (2001), where
cereals for children and adults are not close substitutes). In our context, this
assumption does not appear as too restrictive: DQ services are perceived as close
substitute by consumers.27
27Allenby and Rossi (1991) provide evidence for the conditions under which a simple logit
model performs well with aggregate data. They identify three conditions: that all consumers
27Next we present the deﬁnition and construction of the variables used in the
study.
6.1. Variable deﬁnition
The entrant provided us with their daily call volumes and AHTs; eqs. (1), (2),
and (3) were thus estimated on the basis of daily volumes and prices (computed
on the basis of AHTs). Some of the variables, such as market size, are not publicly
available; competitors’ AHTs (and therefore prices) are not observed with daily
frequency; last, advertising eﬀort is available on a monthly frequency. We therefore
had to construct some of these variables on the basis of reasonable assumptions,
described in the next sub-section.
6.1.1. UK data
To estimate eq. (1)-(2), we need an estimate of actual market size. In October
2004, industry sources estimated that market size had fallen by 45%, representing
315 million calls at that time. We assumed that the monthly reduction was
proportional and constructed total market size accordingly.28 We were able to
cross-check our estimates with the ﬁgures provided by an independent consultancy.
Performance House/118 tracker provides an estimate for monthly market size
during the period December 2003-November 2004. Their estimate of total market
volume over that time period stands at 378 million calls, while our estimate yields
370 million for the same time period. In addition, the correlation between the
two monthly series is 0.9. We are therefore conﬁdent that we have used a fairly
a c c u r a t em e a s u r eo fU Km a r k e ts i z ea n di t se v o l u t i o n .T h a tm a r k e tv o l u m eﬁgure
are exposed to the same marketing mix variables; that the brands are close substitutes; and that
the distribution of prices is not concentrated at an extreme value. All three conditions seem
quite reasonable in our context.
28More precisely we assumed that volumes in October 2004 were equal to 26250000 monthly
calls, and that they stood at 50416666 in March 2003. We applied a proportional monthly
reduction between these two dates.
28includes outsourcing services, that is calls attended on behalf of another company.
We consider outsourcing as forming a distinct market, as it is not directed at ﬁnal
consumers. The market size we used for the UK nets out outsourcing calls from
total call volumes. We divided monthly volume by the number of days of each
month in order to get daily market size.
To estimate eq. (3), we also need to deﬁne the potential market for the UK.
We have chosen the total number of calls prior to liberalisation as representing the
potential market. According to BT, market volume stood at about 600 million
calls at the time when the 192 number was abolished (August 2003). This is the
value for potential market size that we use for the UK when estimating eq. (3).
In its study of service quality, OFCOM (2004) indicates that there are at least
30 active providers. According to the Performance House report mentioned above,
four numbers (BT, The Number, Conduit, and Yell) represent more than 93% of
total volume. These, plus Maureen, are the competitors that we included in the
empirical exercise. To construct their prices, we used publicly available infor-
mation on their tariﬀ structure (and changes thereof over time) and the average
AHTs provided by OFCOM. As far as the new entrant is concerned, we were able
to construct daily prices for services provided through BT’s network (minutes
charged divided by the total number of calls, taking into account the entrant’s
tariﬀ structure). The regressor is then the price in the case of eq. (3), and the
entrant’s relative price when we estimate eq. (1) and (2)
Monthly advertising expenditure for the entrant and all of its competitors was
obtained from Initiative UK, a market intelligence ﬁrm; the original data comes
from the Nielsen Media Research Multimedia System. The ﬁgure represents gross
advertising (i.e. prior to discounts) in all outlets: TV, newspapers, radio, movie
theaters, and street advertising. The regressor is simply the ratio of the entrant’s
29advertising to total eﬀort when estimating eq. (1) and (2), and advertising spend
when estimating eq. (3).
6.1.2. Spanish data
According to the CMT, the total number of calls stood at 192 million in 2002.
This is the value that we use for the potential market in Spain. For 2003, the
CMT annual report indicates that call volumes stood at 127,26 million at year
end. One year later, the same source reported that volumes had fallen to 99.7
m i l l i o nc a l l si n2 0 0 4 .W eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h i sd r o po c c u r r e dm o n t hb ym o n t h
in a proportional manner. As in the British case, we divided monthly volume by
the number of days of each month in order to get daily market size. Since no
company provides outsourcing services in Spain, no adjustment was made to total
market size.
At the end of 2003, 95% of calls we concentrated in four numbers: TPI’s
11888 (TPI is a fully controlled Telefónica subsidiary), Telefónica’s two numbers
(11818, and 11822; the latter started operating in July 2003), Telegate’s 11811,
and Conduit (11850). Another two numbers have gained market share in 2004:
Multiasistencia y Gestión (MGA, 11824, that starts operations in June 2003) and
Antena 3’s number, 11843, that was launched in May 2004. These are the agents
that we used in the empirical analysis. In order to construct competitors’ eﬀective
prices, we divided the total number of minutes by call volumes for each operator
on the basis of the data reported in the CMT annual report. For the entrant,
we constructed daily prices (used in eq. (3)), as we have AHTs for each day.
With this information in hand, we built the entrant’s relative price (used in eq.
(1) and (2)). To build this variable, we had to assume that competitors’ AHTs
obtained from the CMT report remained constant. The entrant’s advertising eﬀort
30relative to its competitors has been calculated on the basis of the data provided
by Initiative España. The original data comes from INFOADEX, a specialist
provider of advertising data in Spain. As in the UK, we constructed the ratio of
the entrant’s eﬀort to total advertising expenditure. Table 3 provides summary
statistics for each of the two markets.
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 4 reports information that we deemed useful for understanding the situ-
ation. It relates operators advertising eﬀort to their market share in Spain. Some
interesting patterns emerge: for instance, in view of their advertising, it seems
that new entrants systematically achieve a lower market share compared to the
Telefónica numbers.29
Insert Table 4 about here
7. Econometric results and quantiﬁcation of damages
As mentioned above, we are unable to compute the abuse-free proﬁts that the
entrant’s would have obtained by choosing prices and advertising optimally, which
correspond to Π1, Π1∗ or Π2 as deﬁned on the basis of Figures 3a & 3b. In the
case of Figure 3a, it is assumed that forced QD only results in an inward shift
of the residual demand faced by the entrant. We approximate Π1 from below by
estimating eq. (1), (2), and (3) for the UK, and then use parameter estimates and
observed prices and advertising in Spain to predict the entrant’s markets share
had forced QD been absent. In Figure 3b, the abuse free residual demand is more
29Clearly, this information is incomplete, as it does not take into account prices. However,
given that Telefónica’s prices (and in particular, TPI’s) are among the highest, the inference
that can be drawn from Table 3 would not vary had prices been properly taken into account.
31elastic as compared to the previous case, reﬂecting the fact that the intensity of
competition would have been higher. Under this scenario, we approximated Π2
from below in the following manner: we assumed that the entrants behaviour in
terms of pricing and advertising eﬀort would have been identical on both the UK
and Spanish markets. We thus use parameter estimates and observed prices and
advertising in the UK to predict the entrant’s markets share had forced QD been
absent.30
Clearly, there may exist seasonal inﬂuences. For instance, Bank Holidays,
Summer months (July and August), the Christmas season or even the day of the
week may inﬂuence consumption patterns. Since there is n oap r i o r ir e a s o nt o
believe that seasonality patterns are the same in Spain and the UK, we decom-
posed the predicted market share for Spain in two pieces: the non seasonal part
and the seasonal part. We used a three stages procedure to recover these two
elements. First, we estimated the three equations for the UK with the full set of
time dummies (daily and monthly). Next, we predicted the entrant’s non season-
ally adjusted market share in Spain using the parameters estimates obtained for
the UK, save for the time dummies. We then computed the diﬀerence between
this prediction and observed market share in Spain, obtaining a set of residuals.
The latter were then regressed on all time dummies, obtaining a set of estimates
of time dummies for Spain that are used to predict the seasonal component of the
entrant’s market share. Last, we constructed the predicted market share as the
sum of the seasonal and non-seasonal components estimated previously.
Our central results are obtained with three diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst
two correspond to the additive and multiplicative speciﬁcations of eqs. (1) and (2).
30Note that this second exercise provides a “lower bound” to the “lower bound” of lost proﬁts
derived from the abuse. As argued above, all estimates are obtained from “below”; in addition,
competition was tougher in the UK. Thus, this second exercise underestimates by a large margin
the proﬁts that the entrant would have obtained on the Spanish market.
32Both sets of results are presented in table 5. The third set of results, presented in
table 6, is obtained from estimating the logit demand eq. (3).
Before discussing the results in Tables 5 and 6, a short discussion of the possible
endogeneity of the explanatory variables is warranted. As mentioned above, given
the data constraints and the way we deal with daily observations for advertising,
we assume the endogeneity of these variables and test the possible endogeneity
of the variables of prices. As instruments we use the sum of the competitors’
advertising, current and lagged up to two periods (that is, dated at time t, t − 1,
and t −2).31, 32 The bottom part of Tables 5 and 6 report the values of an incre-
mental Sargan tests and their p-values for a test of the exogeneity of prices. These
tables also provide Hansen J statistics and their p-values to test the adequacy of
the instruments used for advertising by testing the two implied overidentiﬁcation
restrictions. As it can be seen, we can not reject the exogeneity of prices in any of
the three models. Moreover, the Hansen J statistics for the instruments suggest
that we can not reject these implied overidentifying restrictions. Therefore, and
on the basis of all these tests, the ﬁnal estimated speciﬁcations considers prices as
exogenous while advertising is instrumented with competitors’ current advertising.
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here
Table 5 presents our central GMM results for the additive and multiplicative
models while Table 6 presents the results for the logit demand model. Recall
that these estimations are obtained for the UK market; we do not estimate the
evolution of the entrant’s market share with Spanish data. In both Tables 5 and
31We also experimented with alternative instruments such as Conduit’s (accounting) marginal
costs. However, given Conduit’s start up strategy described above (low prices that are progres-
sively increased), there is a strong spurious negative correlation between price and marginal
costs. This spurious correlation translates into less precise estimates.
32In the multiplicative model (eq. (2)), the explanatory variable is the log of advertising and
the instrument is the log of competitors’ advertising.
336, the goodness of ﬁt is high: the adjusted R2 ranges from a minimum of 0.61
(model [I]), to 0.90 (speciﬁcation [III]). The variables of interest (relative prices
and advertising) have the expected sign and are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
These estimates are used to predict the Conduit’s market share in Spain had
forced QD not occurred, given the prices and advertising chosen by that ﬁrm.
Graphs 3, 4 and 5 present the observed market shares as well as the predicted
ones for the speciﬁcations for the whole period (for reasons of conﬁdentiality, the
vertical axis has been re-scaled, i.e. the values appearing on the vertical axis
are imaginary). The predicted market share in Graph 3 is constructed with the
point estimates obtained from model [I], in Graph 4 we have used model [II]
and ﬁnally in Graph 5 we have used model [III]. In the three cases, we observe
that the predicted market share stands above what the entrant achieved in Spain.
This visual evidence also indicates that our econometric model does a good job
of picking-up the turning points in the evolution of the entrant’s market share.
Insert Graphs 3, 4 and 5 about here
From the diﬀerence in the market shares presented in Graph 3-5, we estimate
the damages as well as the number of lost calls for the three speciﬁcations. The
results are shown in Panel A of Table 7. For reasons of conﬁdentiality, the mone-
tary amounts and lost calls have been scaled to 100 with respect to model [III]. As
can be readily seen, the range of damage estimates is pretty narrow: the largest
diﬀerence is between speciﬁcations [I] and [II] and amounts to 13.7%. In general
it can be seen that the multiplicative model [II] tends to predict higher damages
and lost calls while the logit model [III] predicts lower amounts.
Insert Table 7 about here
34Panel B of table 7 shows the damages as well as the number of lost calls under
ad i ﬀe r e n ts c e n a r i o :o n ei nw h i c hC o n d u i tw ould have acted in Spain exactly as
it did in the UK in terms of prices and advertising. As argued in section 4, this
proxies lost proﬁts in Spain had competition been as tough as in the UK. Recall
that this represents the “lower bound” of the “lower bound” in terms of actual
damages suﬀered. The lower panel of Table 7 indicates that Conduit would have
enjoyed a much larger market share. The estimation of losses is lower, reﬂecting
the fact that prices are consistently higher (around 15 € cents per call) in Spain
as compared to the UK.
8. Robustness checks
We interpret the small variation in the estimation of damages across speciﬁca-
tions as evidence that our results are robust. In this section, we provide simple
additional robustness checks.
8.1. Monthly data
S i n c ew ee i t h e re s t i m a t e dd a i l yﬁxed eﬀects for Spain in an indirect manner and
transformed monthly variables into daily ones, we re-estimated eq. (1) and (2)
with monthly data for the period April 2003-October 2004 by simple OLS.33 The
results are presented in Table 8.
Insert Tables 8 about here
The goodness of ﬁt is slightly lower when compared to the estimates appearing
in Tables 5 and 6, but it remains reasonably high. In the same vein, the point
33We choose OLS over GMM because of the reduced sample size with monthly data (19
observations). Moreover the correlation between advertising and the error term due to the way
in which we constructed the daily variable disappears with monthly data.
35estimates for relative prices and advertising are less precisely but they remain
of the expected sign and their magnitude is similar to that obtained in the ﬁrst
estimation. Despite the fact that the sample is much smaller, our estimation of
injury remains practically identical. Table 9 provides estimates of damages as well
as lost calls. The ﬁgures are expressed as a fraction of the estimates obtained with
daily data and model [I].
Insert Table 9 about here
Graph 6 compares the entrant’s actual market share in Spain and the one it
could have hoped to achieve given its relative price and advertising eﬀort. Again,
the pattern is very similar to what is obtained with daily data.
Insert Graph 6 about here
8.2. Competitors
At one point, we obtained some additional data pertaining to the entrant’s main
competitors in Spain, and in particular, the evolution of their monthly market
share over the period July 2003-October 2004. We are therefore able to assess
whether our econometric estimates can predict the evolution of the market share
of the entrant’s competitors. In other words, we want to see whether our approach
allows us to predict the “ups” and “downs” in the market share of other operators.
The information we have pertains to four additional 118AB numbers. Graphs 7
and 8 present the actual market share and the ones that our econometrics would
predict for two of these operators. As before, the vertical axis has been re-scaled.
In addition, we do not specify which curve pertains to the predicted and actual
market shares. Apart from conﬁdentiality, this omission is due to the fact that we
36can not estimate a ﬁrm speciﬁce ﬀect (the constant) for each of these operators.
This means that our predictions are up to a scale parameter.
Insert Graphs 7 and 8 about here
This visual evidence suggests that the econometric model does a good job of
approximating the evolution in the market shares of Conduit’s competitors.
8.3. Proﬁtability
It is also possible to check that some market-wide variables have behaved in a
manner consistent with the existence of an abuse on the Spanish market. We
therefore computed average price-cost margins as a proxy for the intensity of
competition.34 On the cost side, the pre-liberalisation regulated price was chosen
as an estimation of marginal cost for all ﬁrms in the market. For prices, we
took the simple, unweighted, average price of the operators that were used in
the econometric exercise. In the case of Spain, we also computed the average
margin with a higher estimate of marginal cost, since Telefónica has systematically
complained that the regulated rate did not cover variable costs. More precisely,
we computed the margin with a marginal cost of 0.55 € instead of 0.35€.35 The
larger number is very similar to the UK (40 p., i.e. 0.571 €). Graph 9 plots the
evolution of average price-cost margins. The initial drop in margins observed in
Spanish margins is due to the reaction of Telefónica to entry (TPI halved its prices
from 2.06€ to 1.06€)a n dt h ef a c tt h a tC o n d u i t ’ se ﬀective prices were high due
34The use of proﬁtability measures in antitrust cases has been heavily criticised (see Fisher
(2006)). However, note that we do not use indicators of individual ﬁrm proﬁtability, but the
average for a market were eﬃciency diﬀerences between ﬁrms are small or (economically) irrel-
evant. More importantly, we only use average margins as corroborating evidence compatible
with the existence of an abuse.
35The price of the regulated number (11818) was maintained at 0.355€ from April 2003 to
July 2005. In July 2005, the price of 11818 was liberalised, and Telefónica raised it to 0.55€.
37to abuse induced abnormal AHTs. Despite this initial drop, margins are much
higher in Spain than in the UK, even when the higher estimate for marginal cost
is used.36 Note that this is perfectly compatible with an exclusion strategy based
on forced QD and RRDC instead of predatory prices.
I n s e r tG r a p h9a b o u th e r e
9. Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, we argue that Telefónica had the ability to abuse its dominant
position in the Spanish DQ market, and that this was a perfectly rational strategy.
The essence of the abuse consisted of forcing a deterioration in the quality of
the products oﬀered by its competitors. This forced “vertical” diﬀerentiation
would have been absent had abuse not taken place. Apart from resulting in an
inward shift of the residual demand faced by Conduit, it generated additional
pecuniary costs. These facts were ﬁrst established by the Comisión del Mercado
de Telecomunicaciones, were then accepted by Madrid 5th Commercial Court, and
were ﬁnally upheld in appeal. Thus, the factual evidence is not under discussion
in this particular case.
Section 3 dwells on the rationality of the Telefónica’s behaviour and stresses
that, because of large search costs in relation to potential savings, the abuse had
long lasting eﬀects. Section 4 shows that, in the case at hand, the total eﬀect of the
abuse is always larger than the direct pecuniary cost. That section also explains
that, subject to accepting our speciﬁcation, all the econometric evidence yields a
lower bound of true damages. Section 7 presents consistent and robust damage
estimates obtained with three distinct speciﬁcations. Last, section 8 reports a
36This industry wide information is corroborated by Conduit’s own EBIDTAs.
38battery of robustness checks that are consistent with our main ﬁndings
Summing-up, the Courts did not question the existence of an abuse and the
empirical evidence appears as robust and consistent. Despite this, the Courts de-
cided to award a tiny amount of damages, and this decision was upheld in appeal.
Concretely, the amount awarded represents a fraction of “direct costs” and about
10%-15% of total damages that we estimated (recall that our estimates provide a
lower bound). In fact, all the forensic economic evidence was ignored: the dam-
age award was almost entirely based on invoices stemming from Conduit’s inﬂated
costs (e.g. E.115). It is unclear whether this disregard for economic and economet-
ric evidence is driven by excessive caution or simply a lack of understanding. With
respect to the former, both decisions allude to the fact that the direct causal link
between the abuse and the loss of market share had not been established beyond
reasonable doubt. As a possible explanation for Conduit’s poor performance on
the Spanish market, the judge suggested that Conduit had hired poorly trained
personnel and that it lacked experience on the Spanish market. This begs the
question as to how Conduit successfully managed to enter in other non-English
speaking markets such as Austria (12% market share) and Switzerland (5% mar-
ket share), and why it would have risked the loss of a lucrative market share by
hiring poorly trained personnel. In any event, even if some credence to this claim
(Conduit hired poorly trained personnel), this would not invalidate our main ﬁnd-
ings. At most, it could serve to attribute part of Conduit’s poorer performance
on the Spanish market to a factor other than forced QD.
More importantly, both decisions interpreted the evidence in a manner which is
inconsistent with economics. Conceptually, the recognition that Conduit incurred
direct costs inexorably leads to the conclusion that total damages are larger than
these direct costs (and not a fraction of them). The second economic inconsistency
39regards the interpretation of econometric evidence. Both decisions argued that
Conduit’s poor performance in Spain was due to its limited advertising eﬀorts. In
other words, the decisions looked at simple correlations (larger advertisers achieve
a larger market shares), and not conditional correlations (given an advertising ef-
f o r t ,w h a tm a r k e ts h a r eo u g h tt oh a v eb e e na c h i e v e d ) .T h ef a c tt h a tt h ed a m a g e
estimations are obtained conditional on Conduit’s pricing and advertising behav-
iour appears to have escaped the Courts.
It is clearly to early to say, but this apparent lack of understanding of basic
economics and econometrics suggests that the application of Article 82 in private
litigation may not yield the expected results. Last, the small amount of damages
awarded despite the clarity of the abusive behaviour raises the issue of deterrence.
It is not unreasonable to think that award damages of this kind will have little, if
any, deterrent eﬀect.
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43Table 1: Advertising intensity
Advertising (A)a Number of calls (B) Intensity (A/B)￿100
UK
April-December 2003 62929585 338751597 18.58
January-October 2004 36726834 278949099 13.17
Spain
April-December 2003 15086829 93564506 16.12
January-October 2004 45873127 84842494 54.07





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 5: Results: multiplicative and additive models
Variables Additive[I] Multiplicative[II]
(A) (B) (A) (B)
relPt -0.0992** 0.0477 -0.5233** 0.2406
relAt 0.2516* 0.0762 0.0206*** 0.0114
Constant 0.1830* 0.0423 -2.0361* 0.2041
Time dummies
Apr.-Aug. 03 -0.1457* 0.0217 -1.2855* 0.3305
Bank Holid. -0.0403* 0.0068 -0.6969* 0.1160
July 0.0141*** 0.0083 0.1368 0.1837
August 0.0374* 0.0135 0.2851 0.2769
Christmas -0.0195 0.0121 -0.2505*** 0.1338
Year 03 0.0117 0.0159 0.2291 0.1496
Tuesday -0.0027 0.0020 0.0092 0.0220
Wednesday -0.0044** 0.0019 -0.0043 0.0234
Thursday -0.0040*** 0.0022 0.0058 0.0342
Friday -0.0072* 0.0020 -0.0416*** 0.0245
Saturday -0.0580* 0.0037 -0.7144* 0.0324
Sunday -0.0825* 0.0048 -1.2733* 0.0423
# observ. 573 573
R-squared 0.607 0.731
TESTS
Exogeneity of prices 0.2780 0.0590
￿2(1): p-value 0.5978 0.8080
Hansen J statistic of overid. 0.2830 2.0110
￿2(2): p-value 0.8679 0.3659
Notes: (A): coe¢ cient estimates; (B) standard errors robust to autocorrela-
tion and heteroscedasticity; Endogenous regressors: Relative advertising; In-
struments: (Total advertising-Advertising of entrant) dated in t, t-1 and t-2.
(*) Signi￿cant at the al 1%; (**) Signi￿cant at 5% level; (***) Signi￿cant at the
al 10% level.







Apr.-Aug. 2003 -0.7978* 0.1219














Exogeneity of prices 2.4980
￿2(1): p-value 0.2868
Hansen J statistic of overid. 0.0320
￿2(2): p-value 0.8581
Notes: (A): coe¢ cient estimates; (B) standard errors robust to autocorrela-
tion and heteroscedasticity; Endogenous regressors: Advertising; Instruments:
(Total advertising-Advertising of entrant) dated in t, t-1 and t-2
(*) Signi￿cant at the 1%; (**) Signi￿cant at 5% level; (***) Signi￿cant at the
10% level.
49Table 7: Damage estimates and number of lost calls (Model [III] =
100).
Model #of calls Lost pro￿ts
PANEL A
Using observed data (prices and advertising)
Additive I 86.13 101.33
Multiplicative II 119.49 113.69
Logit Demand III 100.00 100.00
PANEL B
Using UK data (prices and advertising)
Additive I 99.58 49.82
Multiplicative II 139.51 36.34
Logit Demand III 165.86 43.32
Computed over 19 months (April 2003 ￿October 2004),
50Table 8: OLS estimates of Conduit￿ s market share with monthly data
Variables Additive model Multiplicative model
(A) (B) (A) (B)
relPt -0.0957* 0.0291 -0.6404*** 0.3067
relAt 0.0848** 0.036 0.0046 0.0063
Apr.-Aug. 03 -0.0852* 0.0168 -0.8354* 0.2408
Constant 0.1722* 0.0251 -2.4053* 0.1181
#of observations 19 19
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.39
Notes: (A): coe¢ cient estimates; (B) standard error
(*) Signi￿cant at the 1%; (**) Signi￿cant at the 5%; (***) Signi￿cant at the
10%
Table 9: Damage estimates and number of lost calls obtained with
monthly data. Each cell is expressed as a proportion of the estimates
obtained with model [I] and daily data
#of calls lost Lost pro￿ts
Additive model 96.0 106.4
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Figure 2: Evolution of an entrant’s market share not subjected to an abuse (continuous line) vs. an entrant subjected to forced 
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Figure 3b: Tougher competition in the absence of abuse 
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